Book Review: The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, by David Kilcullen
By
Joshua Welsh
In “The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,” David Kilcullen draws on his extensive experience as a counterinsurgency expert to offer a nuanced analysis of modern conflicts in regions such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Southeast Asia. Kilcullen’s central thesis is that many insurgents are “accidental guerrillas” who fight not out of hatred for the West or a desire for global jihad but because foreign forces have intruded into their local areas and influenced their decisions. This perspective is crucial for understanding why seemingly small insurgencies can grow into significant threats and how they can affect broader geopolitical conflicts.
David Kilcullen delineates modern conflicts into four phases: infection, contagion, intervention, and rejection. The first phase, infection, is characterized by establishing local cells by takfiri groups. These groups build support networks, gather intelligence, and forge alliances with local tribes and leaders, often utilizing intermarriage and shared business ventures as strategies. They may establish businesses, front companies, or collaborate with local criminals to further their cause. Additionally, they set up indoctrination centers, training camps, and logistical hubs to support their operations (Kilcullen, 2009, p.35). In Kilcullen’s view, initial regional grievances serve as a spark, attracting foreign actors who seize the opportunity to exploit the situation, leading to contagion. This phase sees the group’s influence spreading, impacting the host nation and potentially affecting neighboring states and, through globalization, even distant countries via terrorism and propaganda (Kilcullen, 2009, p.36). In the intervention phase, external forces, local governments, regional powers, or the international community, respond to counter the extremist spread. However, Kilcullen notes that this often gives rise to the rejection phase. Here, local populations may begin fighting alongside extremists, not out of ideological alignment, but as a reaction against external interference and in defense of local interests (Kilcullen, 2009, p.38). This dynamic illustrates Kilcullen’s central thesis: aggressive intervention often exacerbates tensions and inadvertently transforms local populations into ‘accidental guerrillas,’ thus fueling greater resistance.
Kilcullen acknowledges the inherent complexity of the modern threat environment, recognizing that no single model adequately captures its multifaceted nature. He presents four distinct but interconnected models for understanding contemporary conflicts and addressing these situations. The first, the Globalization Backlash model, posits that many current conflicts are reactions to the perceived negative consequences of globalization. Globalization, while fostering interconnectedness and economic growth, has also led to a sense of cultural homogenization, often dominated by Western values and norms. This, in turn, fuels resentment and resistance in various parts of the world, manifesting as localized insurgencies and conflicts that, while seemingly disparate, share common underlying patterns of response to the pressures of globalization (Kilcullen, 2009, p.7). The second model is the Globalized Insurgency model, which details how globalization facilitates the spread of extremist ideologies and coordinating insurgent activities across borders (Kilcullen, 2009, p.12). The third model, the Islamic Civil War theory, focuses on the internal conflicts and sectarian divisions within the Muslim world, arguing that these internal struggles are a significant driver of terrorism and insurgency (Kilcullen, 2009, p.16). Finally, the Asymmetric Warfare model analyzes the conflict from a purely functional perspective, focusing on the disparity in military capabilities between powerful states like the U.S. and less technologically advanced actors. This model argues that the very nature of terrorism and insurgency stems from this power imbalance, where weaker actors utilize unconventional tactics to offset their technological disadvantages, highlighting the limitations of a purely military response (Kilcullen, 2009, p.22). These four models, therefore, provide a more comprehensive framework for understanding the complex interplay of factors driving modern conflicts, emphasizing that a single lens is insufficient to grasp the intricate realities at play.
The book’s most notable strengths lie in its thoughtfully crafted structure, which seamlessly blends theoretical analysis with immersive field-based case studies. This dual approach equips readers with both abstract frameworks and concrete, real-world applications. Kilcullen takes the audience on a journey through various conflict zones, where he provides firsthand accounts and meticulous analysis of the intricate dynamics of insurgency in each region. He underscores the critical importance of grasping the nuances of local cultures, traditions, and social hierarchies in formulating effective military and political strategies. In doing so, he challenges the often simplistic and uniform strategies favored by foreign powers, advocating for a more nuanced, context-sensitive approach to conflict engagement. The two case studies most effective at capturing the “accidental guerrilla” syndrome cycle are Afghanistan’s “The Crazies Will Kill Them” and “The Twenty-First Day”: Iraq during the Surge, 2007.
Afghanistan case study:
The Afghanistan case study highlights the complexities of counterinsurgency in a challenging environment characterized by a confluence of factors: a rugged terrain, a large and dispersed population, the Taliban insurgency, and the presence of terrorist groups. The Taliban’s operational structure is a crucial element to understanding the conflict. They maintain a core of full-time fighters but primarily rely on a larger force of part-time fighters drawn from local populations, mobilized only during active conflict. This flexible structure allows them to rapidly amass significant personnel when needed, posing a constant challenge to counterinsurgency efforts (Kilcullen, 2009, p.49). The Taliban’s tactics are equally significant. They excel in asymmetric warfare techniques like reconnaissance, ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and sniper operations. Crucially, they employ sophisticated information operations and propaganda, using simple, relatable slogans to sway local populations and undermine government legitimacy. Their strategy focuses on avoiding decisive defeat, creating persistent disorder, and challenging government authority, thereby preventing local populations from cooperating with the government for fear of retaliation (Kilcullen, 2009, p.60).
The counterinsurgency effort’s fundamental task is securing and controlling the population to marginalize and ultimately defeat the Taliban gradually. However, this needed to be improved by the inadequate training of Afghan security forces. The Afghan National Army (ANA) received minimal counterinsurgency training, and the Afghan National Police (ANP) received none, severely limiting their effectiveness in addressing the insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures (Kilcullen, 2009, p.61). Successful counterinsurgency requires a multi-pronged approach that goes beyond purely military tactics. It demands effective community engagement and focused information operations, primarily achieved through Key Leader Engagements (KLE) with local leaders and power brokers. Winning the hearts and minds of the population requires actively building local alliances and fostering trust.
Kilcullen suggests six key elements for achieving success against the Taliban: securing the population, dismantling the Taliban’s organizational structure, building local alliances, denying the Taliban access to the population, implementing a full-spectrum political strategy (including diplomatic, development, and economic initiatives), and establishing a persistent presence of security forces (Kilcullen, 2009, p.110). While requiring significant resources, this persistent presence ultimately shifts the tactical advantages from the guerilla to the counterinsurgency forces. Finally, the “by, with, and through” approach emphasizes the importance of coordinating efforts with local forces, equipping, training, conducting joint operations, and promoting a collaborative and sustainable counterinsurgency strategy.
Iraq case study:
As detailed in this case study, the Iraq “Surge” of 2007 presents a complex counterinsurgency challenge exceeding the scope of a traditional insurgency. The conflict was not simply an insurgency; it was a hybrid war encompassing an insurgency, a terrorist campaign, sectarian conflict, ethnic tensions, involvement of foreign fighters, and regional geopolitical rivalries, all layered upon a fragile and divided state (Kilcullen, 2009, p.149). This multifaceted nature created an environment ripe for the “accidental guerrilla” phenomenon, where individuals were drawn into conflict not out of ideological conviction but due to local circumstances and reactions to the broader conflict. The case study highlights the actions of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which provoked and targeted Shia Muslims, leading to the “ethnic cleansing” of significant parts of Baghdad. This violence created a volatile environment where many Iraqis became involved in the conflict, either directly fighting or supporting one side or the other, often due to grievances against AQI or the resulting chaos. This highlights the importance of understanding the dynamics of the conflict beyond a simplistic view of AQI’s actions.
A key turning point in the “Surge” was the empowerment of local communities. Tribal sheiks and leaders, recognizing the destructive impact of AQI, formed local security forces to expel them from their villages. This initiative proved strategically vital with a bottom-up approach, starting with the local leadership’s cooperation and support. The collaboration between United States (U.S.) forces, Iraqi security forces, and these local militias created a unified front against AQI, demonstrating the effectiveness of integrating local populations into security operations (Kilcullen, 2009, p.159). This approach yielded significant success, driving AQI out of numerous districts. Importantly, involving local forces mitigated the risk of radicalizing the population. While the detention of innocent Iraqis fueled resentment toward coalition forces, empowering local communities to police themselves reduced this resentment. This strategy also distinguished between hardened AQI leadership and ordinary fighters (Kilcullen, 2009, p.173). Local leaders, while wanting the elimination of AQI leadership, often sought to spare ordinary fighters, these “accidental guerrillas” who were drawn into the conflict by external circumstances.
The emergence of a unified, armed Sunni population in 2007 was a decisive factor that significantly influenced the course of events. It created an informal structure of authority, fostering political unity and social cohesion within the community. This contrasted sharply with the prior fragmentation of hundreds of independent insurgent groups, which were difficult to control and often acted contrary to local community interests. This newfound unity allowed tribal leaders to secure their communities and effectively counter AQI. Crucially, the tribal reconciliation processes were instrumental in the success of the Surge, serving as a cornerstone that facilitated cooperation and stability. By prioritizing reconciliation within tribal structures, the focus shifted towards marginalizing AQI’s hardline elements while allowing many “accidental guerrillas” willing to reconcile to reintegrate into society. This demonstrates that successful counterinsurgency in complex situations requires strategies that address local grievances, integrate local communities, and engage in effective reconciliation initiatives (Kilcullen, 2009, p.166). The Iraqi experience of 2007 showcases a clear departure from traditional counterinsurgency approaches, highlighting the critical importance of a nuanced and culturally sensitive strategy that leverages local agency and fosters political unity.
Kilcullen’s emphasis on building local governance and infrastructure as crucial elements in counterinsurgency represents a significant departure from purely military-focused approaches. His “hearts and minds” strategy transcends simple propaganda; it necessitates a genuine commitment to improving the lives of the local population. This holistic approach recognizes that military action alone is insufficient, often counterproductive, and potentially fuels resentment, thus driving further recruitment into insurgent groups. Winning “hearts and minds” requires a demonstrable improvement in the quality of life, including security, essential services, and economic opportunities. This holistic strategy demands a coordinated effort combining military, political, and developmental components. Military actions should be carefully targeted and proportionate, aiming to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage. Simultaneously, political strategies must focus on establishing legitimate and effective governance structures that are responsive to the needs of the local population. This includes fostering inclusive political processes, ensuring fair representation, and addressing historical grievances. Developmental elements are equally vital. Investing in infrastructure projects (roads, schools, hospitals, water systems) creates tangible improvements, enhancing the local quality of life and demonstrating the benefits of cooperation with the government and counterinsurgency forces.
Kilcullen’s insightful blend of ground-level observations and strategic foresight is a significant strength of his work. His firsthand experience provides rich detail and context to his analysis, making his arguments relatable and compelling. This nuanced perspective avoids overly simplistic generalizations and recognizes the complexity and variability of insurgent movements. The book combines detailed case studies with broader theoretical frameworks, offering policymakers and military leaders practical and actionable insights grounded in real-world experience. Kilcullen’s accessible writing style is one of his greatest strengths. However, he sometimes introduces complex ideas and concepts using technical jargon that may be unfamiliar to some readers. Despite this, his clarity ensures that his key recommendations are easily understood and implemented. These recommendations emphasize the importance of a holistic, long-term commitment to rebuilding governance and infrastructure, addressing local grievances, and fostering community ownership. Notably, Kilcullen stresses the need for collaboration with local communities and the integration of local knowledge into security strategies. This approach highlights the limitations of relying solely on top-down, military-centric methods and advocates for collaborative and sustainable solutions.
In conclusion, Kilcullen’s “The Accidental Guerrilla” critiques traditional Western counterinsurgency strategies, highlighting how heavy-handed interventions often exacerbate conflicts and lead to unintended consequences. The book delves into the root causes of insurgency, emphasizing local grievances, historical injustices, and socio-economic factors rather than just ideological motivations. Kilcullen argues that small-scale local conflicts can escalate when interventions overlook cultural nuances and local power dynamics. He advocates for a thorough understanding of local contexts instead of relying solely on military force to develop sustainable solutions. The book analyzes past failures that resulted from misinterpretations of local situations and underscores the importance of a culturally informed, holistic approach. This approach should integrate military actions with political and developmental initiatives. Ultimately, “The Accidental Guerrilla” calls for a long-term commitment to fostering peace and stability through comprehensive engagement that prioritizes local ownership and participation.
References:
Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars In The Midst Of A Big One. C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.