The following is part four of a five part series about Huawei, the Chinese telecom giant. I wrote this paper while I was working on my Master’s Degree at Penn State and believe that is relevant today given the simmering tensions with China. In my opinion, this paper is a tangible example of the Non-Kinetic War that China is waging against us that we previously discussed here. Click the links for Part 1 ,  Part 2 and Part 3 Today we will discuss Chinese Law, Huawei’s CFO, and Recommendations.

Chinese Law

Huawei has continually denied any wrong doing and has stated that they would not “build a back door” or allow the Chinese government access to customer information. (Vaswani, 2019) Is that even a realistic statement? According to two key pieces of Chinese Legislation, 2017 National Intelligence Law and the 2014 Counter-Espionage Law, Huawei would have no choice but to hand over any and all network data if the Chinese Government asked for it. (Kharpal, 2019) Jerome Cohen, a New York University law professor and Council on Foreign Relations adjunct senior fellow stated, ““There is no way Huawei can resist any order from the [People’s Republic of China] Government or the Chinese Communist Party to do its bidding in any context, commercial or otherwise. Huawei would have to turn over all requested data and perform whatever other surveillance activities are required,” (Kharpal, 2019) Additionally, according to Martin Thorley, an expert on international engagement with China at U.K.-based University of Nottingham, “The problem for Huawei is that there does not appear to be legal recourse if Beijing comes knocking. “The idea of fighting a request of this nature in the courts is not realistic. In truth the law only confirms what has long been true — that one must submit to the Party if called upon. Added to this, a company of Huawei’s size, working in what is considered a sensitive sector, simply cannot succeed in China without extensive links to the Party,”’ (Kharpal, 2019)

Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer

In addition to the threat of espionage and the theft of intellectual property, Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer and Ren Zhengfei’s eldest daughter, had been detained by Canadian officials while transferring between flights at Vancouver airport. (Vaswani, 2019) “Under the first indictment, Huawei and Ms. Meng were charged with misleading banks and the US government about their business in Iran.” (Vaswani, 2019) “Over the past couple of years, Huawei has reportedly circumvented sanctions imposed on North Korea and Iran, providing the countries with telecom equipment that can be used for extensive spying on populations, so-called dual use technologies.” (Al Jazeera, 2018) “The fraud allegations against Meng center around the relationship between Huawei and a company called Skycom, that did business in Iran. According to U.S. prosecutors, Skycom was a “hidden” subsidiary of Huawei.” (Proctor, 2018)

Recommendations

There are various technical recommendations that can help provide security in the new 5G world that include:

• “Encryption, segmented network components and stronger standards to protect key systems. Several years ago, the major U.S. telecom providers began designing into their 5G network features aimed at keeping domestic systems safe from spying and cyberattacks by adversaries and criminals.” (Nakashisama and Mekhennet, 2019)
• According to the CTIA, the group representing the U.S. wireless communications companies, enhanced privacy protections are being baked into the 5G standards, including encryption of each device’s so-called IMSI, or unique user identifier. The CTIA also says wireless providers are extending the security of 5G wireless networks to other networks – called home network control – when a user is roaming or using a network like Wi-Fi. (Baig, 2019)

“However, the major alternative 5G equipment suppliers — Finland’s Nokia and Sweden’s Ericsson — manufacture equipment in Chinese factories with partners linked to the Chinese Communist Party, making it impossible to deploy 5G without some dependence on Chinese suppliers.” (Slayton, 2019) Therefore, even if there is a total ban on Huawei the 5G network will almost certainly contain products produced by the Chinese that have the potential to be compromised. There are additional steps that can be taken to limit the impact Huawei could have in the next generation of telecommunication:

• Continue to pressure Allies not to use equipment manufactured by Huawei. The U.S. must maintain pressure on our European allies to limit the use of Huawei manufactured products in critical components that are utilized in our intelligence apparatus.
• Utilize the court system to maintain pressure on Huawei. Aggressive prosecution of Huawei in court cases where malfeasance can be proven will help make the case that they are a legitimate threat to not only steal proprietary information but are a security and espionage threat.
• Aggressively pursue cases of corporate espionage. The Chinese practice of stealing proprietary information must be aggressively pursued by any means possible to include trade negotiations, the U.S. and International Court Systems.
• Limit the sharing of intelligence with countries that use Huawei products. The U.S. Government should follow through with threats to not only limit their own exposure to potential threats but to make it costly for countries to use Huawei.

Change practices and techniques when distributing highly sensitive information on networks that utilize Huawei products.

Tomorrow, we will cover our Conclusion and Updates because this paper was written