I have been looking forward to this since the idea for this blog came into my head. I did not want to write a book review, everyone does that. I wanted to host a book discussion where I and others could talk about the book, work through questions and concepts that were not clear and if given he opportunity, come up with a list of questions for the author if we were ever given an opportunity to ask.
Earlier this week I received my copy of Kilcullen’s latest book, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West. This is the book description from Amazon:
Just a few years ago, people spoke of the US as a hyperpower-a titan stalking the world stage with more relative power than any empire in history. Yet as early as 1993, newly-appointed CIA director James Woolsey pointed out that although Western powers had “slain a large dragon” by defeating the Soviet Union in the Cold War, they now faced a “bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.”
In The Dragons and the Snakes, the eminent soldier-scholar David Kilcullen asks how, and what, opponents of the West have learned during the last quarter-century of conflict. Applying a combination of evolutionary theory and detailed field observation, he explains what happened to the “snakes”-non-state threats including terrorists and guerrillas-and the “dragons”-state-based competitors such as Russia and China. He explores how enemies learn under conditions of conflict, and examines how Western dominance over a very particular, narrowly-defined form of warfare since the Cold War has created a fitness landscape that forces adversaries to adapt in ways that present serious new challenges to America and its allies. Within the world’s contemporary conflict zones, Kilcullen argues, state and non-state threats have increasingly come to resemble each other, with states adopting non-state techniques and non-state actors now able to access levels of precision and lethal weapon systems once only available to governments.
A counterintuitive look at this new, vastly more complex environment, The Dragons and the Snakes will not only reshape our understanding of the West’s enemies’ capabilities, but will also show how we can respond given the increasing limits on US power.
To host this book description we need a plan so that we can read and discuss the book together. So here we go: The Plan
May 8, 2020 – Complete the Introduction and Chapters 1 and 2
May 15, 2020 – Complete Chapters 3 and 4
May 22, 2020 – Complete Chapters 5 and 6
May 29, 2020 – Epilogue, Wrap Up and Questions I would ask the Author
So that’s it. I hope to have a discussion about this book starting next week.
In the mean time, I have had this page open on my browser for almost 10 days waiting to discuss it. Honestly, I don’t remember what I was reading at the time when I stumbled into it, but the paper for today’s discussion will be, The Obsolescence of the Westphalian Model and the Return to A Maximum State of Exception by Khaled Al-Kassimi, McMaster University, Ontario, Canada. Here is the Abstract (Warning this is written by a PhD for PhDs):
The international system is based on the modern conception of the Westphalian model, which organizes and monopolizes violence under the exclusive authority of a sovereign state. This conception only began to characterize global politics in the 19th century and more so at the beginning of the 20th century, contrary to the political myth that perceives the year 1648 as the moment where world state leaders monopolized, organized and structured violence. Author characterize the international system prior to the Westphalian model to be a period of maximum state of exception because states de-monopolized violence and authorized the use of nonstate actors to conduct violence which dominated the international system. The international system transitioned from a maximum state of exception to a minimum state of exception when the Westphalian model began characterizing the international system. In a minimum state of exception, the Weberian state entailed a state monopolization on the authority to deploy violence beyond its borders and the states acceptance of responsibility for violence emanating from its territory. Violence in a minimum state of exception shifted from nonstate actors to citizen-soldier actors. It is the objective of this research paper to highlight three consecutive Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) that occurred in the international system which have modified the actors invovled in war. The latest RMA that occurred at the highpoint of the coldwar, but more so after the declaraction of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), has rendered the Westphalian model obscolescent. The modification of the primary actors in combat has consequently reverted the interntional system to a maximum state of exception where war is now global and an everlasting state in global affairs.
What the hell does that even mean? If reading that makes you want to click this link to read the rest of it and we are having drinks, I am afraid that my Bulliet Rye Whiskey might not be sophisticated enough. Well let me try to summarize it the best that I can.
In 1648 the Peace of Westphalia was signed which brought to an end the Eighty Years War. (Think about the length of that war and apply it to what we are facing today) Most scholars use this date as a demarcation in warfare. Prior to this date, war was typically fought for personal reasons whether it be, religion or wealth. This was the time of privateers, pirates, sell-swords and mercenaries. The Wesphalian Peace deal elevated the sovereignty and the territorial rights of the state beyond individuals and groups, with the state defined by its ability to control violence within its own agreed upon borders. The author claims that this was a long process where you could see examples of the ‘new’ and ‘old’ warfare over several hundred years.
What is a ‘State of Exception?’ A state of exception is basically when the leader of a country secures war powers for execution of war as they see fit. It gets murky because it exists in the space between law and politics. The author claims the the Global War on Terror is a departure from the traditional state of exception because of an ill defined enemy (terror) and a reliance on contractors against non-state actors. Reminiscent of the pre-Westphalian model.
Nonstate Actors, Maximum State of Exception and Unintended Consequences. This section discusses the history of ‘privateering” in a manner that is similar to Sean McFate’s, New Rules for War. Non-state actors, contractors or mercenaries, give the state plausible deniability or ambiguity of consequences. Here they also discuss Mercantilism which “is a policy that is designed to maximize the exports and minimize the imports for an economy. It promotes imperialism, tariffs and subsidies on traded goods to achieve that goal. These policies aim to reduce a possible current account deficit or reach a current account surplus.” (China) The unintended consequences of this is ‘internationalizing” and ‘de-monopolizing violence.’
A minimum state of exception and a desire to de-ligitimize non-state violence. State leaders attempted to organize violence in a way that made sense via international treaty. This allowed the state to sanction a national state army and a leader to decide when and where to fight. A minimum state of exception is the theory that political and economic freedoms are more important than an autocracy.
The Cold War and a return to a Maximum State of Exception. The author notes the heavy reliance on contractors and surrogates during the the Cold War. This time period also oversaw the expansion of executive power that resembles the Maximum State of Exception.
The Author then discusses what has happened since 9-11 and claims that 9-11 is the consequence of the maximum state of exception because the state funds non-state actors. I believe this point could be argued both ways. In fact, the Long War Journal’s Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, briefly discussed this during latest Podcast Generation Jihad Ep. 7 – Jihad in the Time of Coronavirus , which we discussed here. But the Author does raise a good point, who funds these fighters?
In conclusion, war is changing and defining the players on the battlefield is crucial in determining that change. How are the Western Powers going to change with it? Overall, this is a very good paper with concepts that can get lost in the jargon of academia, which is sad given the importance of the topic. Disagree with my interpretation? Drop a line in the comment box and let me know.