Tuesday Terror Update: A New Terror Map, Soleimani’s Will and Podcast Discussion

A very busy week for terror updates…we are going to continue providing our review of relevant written articles in our terror update along with the usual podcasts. First, we will cover some of the terror articles over the last week and then we will work through our 3 podcasts. Hopefully, this will add more context to the discussion and broaden our perspective as we cover all things terror related. On to the articles…

• I don’t know who put this together and I am a little embarrassed that I have not found earlier bet here is an interactive Story Map on ESRI that has every terror attack since 2018 mapped with a short description. If you are not familiar with ESRI story maps you really should check it out. According to data accumulated by ESRI and PeaceTech Lab, utilizing Wikipedia, there have been 42 separate attacks and over 800 fatalities. The map also provides a quick reference to who the terror groups are. This is a really interesting map and I am sure I not doing it enough justice for the work they have put in. It offers a big world view of terror that you do not always get.

• First at The Long War Journal, Thomas Joscelyn writes about the FBI reporting the Pensacola shooter had ‘significant ties’ to AQAP, FBI finds.  The Pensacola shooting terror attack occurred December 6, 2019 and claimed the lives of 3 U.S. sailors and injured 8 others. According to the FBI, the shooter had significant ties to AQAP:

Investigators reached this conclusion after the FBI cracked the encryption on two of AlShamrani’s iPhones. AlShamrani, a member of the Royal Saudi Air Force, was in the U.S. as part of a training program. But he was secretly planning something else. Alshamrani “had specific conversations with overseas AQAP associates about plans and tactics,” according to the DOJ. “In fact,” the DOJ says, Alshamrani “was communicating with AQAP right up until the attack, and conferred with his associates until the night before he undertook the murders.”

Most alarmingly, AQAP has apparently been planning this attack for years and had been scouting various targets:

Not only was Alshamrani in contact with AQAP members just before his shooting spree, he began preparing for his day of terror “years ago.” Alshamrani was “radicalized” by 2015 and joined the Royal Saudi Air Force “in order to carry out a ‘special operation’.”

“For several years, our hero moved between several U.S. military bases in America to select and contemplate his best and fattest target,” Raymi claimed. “Allah bestowed him great patience, and due to the Grace of Him alone, he passed all the military tests and all the security procedures.”

• The Long War Journal’s Bill Roggio reports that As Afghan Army resumes offensive operations, Taliban launches suicide attacks . You can read more about the suicide attack on com, Rahim Faiez provided additional details on the Taliban’s use of a stolen Humvee used as a VBIED and other attacks. Both articles reference the recent ‘Peace Treaty’ that the US signed with the Taliban…

However, the Taliban has been clear it would continue military operations against the Afghan government, which it views as a “puppet” of the U.S., “impotent,” and a “stooge.” The Taliban has refused to negotiate directly with the Afghan government, and has said it would never join with it to govern the country. In fact, just days after the deal was signed, the Taliban said the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the name of its government, was the only legitimate entity to rule Afghanistan, and its emir, Mullah Habiatullah Akhundzada, was its legitimate ruler. [See LWJ report, Taliban religious decree calls for its emir to rule ‘Islamic government’ in Afghanistan.]

I honestly don’t see any way in which the U.S. leaves Afghanistan and a larger civil war doesn’t break out. I guess the only hope would be that ISIS and the Taliban / Al Qaeda begin fighting each other before the Afghan government falls. It appears, according to Richard Sisk also at Military.com that the US Presses Forward with Afghan Withdrawal Plan Despite Spate of Horrific Attacks.

In a series of tweets, and in a conference call with reporters Friday, U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad blamed the Afghan offshoot of the Islamic State (ISIS) for the hospital attack that killed at least 24, and he pressed the Kabul government to begin negotiations with the Taliban on a peace settlement.

• Also at The Long War Journal, Joe Truzman reports: Jaysh al Islam steps up its activities in the Gaza Strip currently these are only media reports and not terrorist activities but if you followed the discussion about the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the Kilcullen Book Discussion here, you know that social outreach is a key component of their local support and influence:

Recently, one of Gaza’s Salafi jihadi groups, Jaysh al Islam (JAI), stepped up its activity in the Gaza Strip. In the last month and a half, the militant group has published material showing its fighters training, conducting community service and interpreting Islamic rulings about COVID-19…

JAI’s publication of its recent activity in the Gaza Strip is a stark difference compared to the last twelve months. During most of 2019, the group was considerably quiet and inactive on social media contrasted to previous years. Its social media channels were removed from Telegram, due in part to its pro-ISIS content, which made it difficult for the group to disseminate information about its activities.

According to the report, the group seems to be lacking funding but that can change quickly and this might just be something to put a pin in to keep in mind should something arise.

• The Long War Journal’s, Caleb Weiss & Joe Truzman writes: Iranian-founded Afghan Shia militia celebrates 7th anniversary in Aleppo . For me, the whole conflict in Syria has been hard to track there are so many different interests and groups there that keeping a score card has proven difficult if not impossible. To use a baseball metaphor, this group is like that important seventh inning reliever that has a nasty breaking ball but you have never heard off:

Liwa Fatemiyoun, an important Iranian-backed proxy fighting in Syria, has released a series of photographs showing its fighters in Aleppo celebrating the seventh anniversary of the group’s founding.

These are Iranian imports primarily from Afghanistan… 

As previously detailed in FDD’s Long War Journal, Liwa Fatemiyoun was established by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in 2013 to fight against Syrian rebels under the pretext of defending the shrine of Sayyida Zainab in Damascus.

The IRGC-sponsored militia primarily recruits from the Hazara population of Afghanistan and Iran. The Hazara are Afghanistan’s largest ethnic minority. Many have fled to Iran to avoid religious persecution in their own war-ravaged country.

…and it doesn’t appear they are going away anytime soon.

• And also, at The Long War Journal, Amir Toumaj provides a detailed Analysis: Soleimani’s last will and testament If you want to try to climb into the mind of a terror mastermind, or at least what he wants you to believe this is it.

More than four months after the US killed Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani in a drone strike, debates about his legacy continue. His last will and testament, published in February, 40 days after his death, has not received much attention in the US. The will reflects the mentality of a dedicated Islamist who believes, or at least wants the reader to believe, that the regime faces existential threats. Declaring the state itself a religious marker, he directly tied the survival of Islam to the Islamic Republic. Tailoring his message to a variety of audiences, he wanted to inspire and mobilize support for the government.

For me, the final pargraph of the post in the most interesting:

There is a perception among some Iranians as well as in the US national security community that Soleimani was a nationalist and patriot. By Soleimani’s own definition, however, he is not a one: a nationalist puts the nation as the most important priority above all else, whereas an Islamist cannot put a nation above religion and the broader Islamic community. Soleimani was aware of the inherent contradiction between nationalism and Islamism. He believed himself a warrior in the divine path and follower of Khomeini’s brand of Islamism that has morphed into the objective of preserving the state at all costs.

I had not even considered the distinction between Nationalist and Islamist as a motivating factor. Maybe that speaks to how truly we in the U.S. are out of touch with the importance of religion. I mean, I was raised Catholic, go to church almost every weekend (non-denomination now) and am involved in a bible study. I wonder who Soleimani considered the biggest threat the U.S. or the Islamic State. If I had to guess it was the Islamic State because they proved to be far more ruthless and have an understanding of the religious importance of the fight they face.

• On this week’s John Batchelor Show terror update with the Long War Journal’s Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio. They have two podcast that cover the previous week.

The first podcast, which can be found here, primarily focuses on the Pensacola Shooting and Roggio’s and Joscelyn’s belief that AQAP will strike again. They also discuss some of the article that we linked to and discussed above. The podcast is about 12 minutes here are some quick notes.

• • The December 6, 2019 attack which was perpetrated by a Saudi National that was training to be a pilot.
  • Knew the shooter was a jihadi, the question was if there was connective tissue. In February, AQAP released a memorial video claiming the attack.
  • Some dismissed the video but the FBI proved that AQAP planned and executed the attack and had been working on it for years.
  • There are also reports that other members of the Saudi Airforce were present the night before. The shooter displayed unbelievable tactical patience.
  • Does not look like a one-off operation. He could have done worse but an Al Qaeda operative was able to get on a U.S. Military base and was successful.
  • AQAP is not an off-shoot. The senior leadership of Al Qaeda set this organization up. They are all connected.
  • The conversation then moves to the Taliban and the latest attacks on the Afghan Army. Although, they acknowledge that the Islamic State may have been responsible for at least some of the latest attacks.
  • The Afghan military is assuming an active defense posture where they react to attacks. The Taliban seems to be increasing the tempo of attacks on the Afghan government.
  • The Taliban publicly states that they are going to establish an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan and discuss the ‘Peace Deal.’

The second podcast, which can be found here, discusses last week’s Generation Jihad podcast which we previously discussed here. In this podcast they discuss, the drone war. The podcast is about 8 minutes.

• • They cover the drone war at large and then ask the question how effective is it? Is there a way to assess the success of this?
  • According to Joscelyn, they are an effective tactic but not an effective strategy.
  • It doesn’t suppress the threat overall, its good at disruption. The terror organizations use the next man up strategy.
  • No doubt that a lot of high value terrorists have been taken out but the question is how many?
  • It is not true that Al Qaeda and others have been decimated. No one has ever given a number of how many senior leaders actually exist and we probably don’t understand the depth and breadth of the organization.
  • Zawahiri is still alive after 20 years.
  • Cannot treat this tool as an entire strategy.

This is a very quick recap of last weeks discussion. In it, I am reminded of the book discussion that we have here and here. Kilcullen, clearly outlines how the terror organizations are adapting to the drone strikes and that in some instances, more capable leaders are emerging due to them. It’s a good podcast if you just have a couple minutes to hit the wave tops but more depth is required to understand the totality of the problem.

• We will also discuss the Long War Journal’s, Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, latest Podcast Generation Jihad Ep. 10: Endless Jihad .The podcast posts every Tuesday morning, it’s about an hour and fifteen minutes, but is well worth the listen. Today they discuss:

Hosts Bill Roggio and Tom Joscelyn discuss the “endless wars” narrative, explaining why it is more accurate to call the conflicts unleashed by 9/11 an “endless jihad.” While there are plenty of legitimate criticisms of America’s warfighting, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere continue because the jihadists fight on.

Of all of their podcast so far this has been my least favorite. In my opinion, they start out strong but spend too much time defending themselves from criticism and too much time criticizing the politics of war. Do they deserve criticism? Yes, they do, but ultimately, I think they failed to make their case. I will talk more about that at the end. I did the best I could to take notes but you should really listen for yourself if you have time. In their latest episode:

• • They talk endless wars and how both sides of the political aisle have discussed the endless wars and the underlying frustration.
  • They would not have believed that the U.S. would still be at war after almost 20 years.
  • They think the ‘Endless War’ narrative is shallow, as if America’s involvement is the only thing keeping these wars going. The jihad will go on and no one talks about the endless Jihad.
  • The podcast will be separated into 3 parts, a brief survey of the Sunni Jihadi world today, not so distant history, and some thoughts on the endless jihad in the great power circles.
  • What does the Sunni jihadi world look like today? – They are trying to resurrect an Islamic Caliphate; this is their central goal. But what does it mean/look like?
  • The idea of a global caliphate did not begin with ISIS it is central to Al Qaeda – The Taliban pre-9-11 provided an example of what that would look like on the ground.
  • Six main theaters: Afghanistan-Pakistan (Taliban, Al Qaeda, ISIS), Iraq-Syria (2 theaters) (ISIS and the ISIS split, Al Qaeda), Somalia and East Africa (Shabab – most effective Taliban Style for Al Qaeda), West Africa (Al Qaeda, ISIS – lots of infighting and the French are highly involved) New York Times, Yemen (Al Qaeda, ISIS, Houthis, Separatists, etc.)
  • There are other theaters but these are the major ones…mention the Philippines and the Islamic Caucus Emirates (good t-shirts?).
  • Mention how much people were invested in denying the Global or International aspirations of these groups…disconnect the dots.
  • Talk about the Islamic Caucus Emirates and the conflict in Russia, ISIS and Al Qaeda trying to poach the leadership there since they are largely defunct (take note of this)
  • ISIS definitely carved into the Al Qaeda ‘market share’
  • Review of Obama trying to end the forever wars…end the war in Iraq and how that tuned out. Obama in 2012 basically declared the war over.
  • We can end our participation in the war, but the jihadist will fight on. If / when the U.S. withdrawals it will be harder for the Long War Journal.
  • Note the commonalities from Trump and Obama rhetoric.
  • Defensive Jihad? – If even a piece of Muslim territory the size of a hand is ruled by an Infidel the jihadis should fight on…Spain…it has to be an acceptable Muslim government (not most of the ME)
  • Important to cover what the jihadis are saying. That is what they are trying to do.
  • It was argued that these groups are all local (I would argue that this point is both, Accidental Guerrilla)
  • Claim there is not much pushback from DoD for getting out of these wars. Only AFRICOM has really pushed back and acknowledge the threat to the greater area. (I am not sure I agree with this section because it is much more complicated but they make some good points this will definitely ruffle some feathers) – They are frustrated with the U.S. Militaries leadership
  • Somebody needs to stand up and say what is going wrong – especially that the Taliban would be an ally in the war on terror.
  • There is a general lack of understanding of what / who / they are fighting.
  • The Taliban went of the offensive after the ‘Peace Accord’ because this is an endless jihad. The Taliban has rejected a cease fire and will fight on. They are clear about their goal – establishing an Islamic Emirate, not a nationalist movement.
  • Claim the Trump administration took a deal the Obama administration rejected.
  • Possible the U.S. missed an opportunity to end this very early when they failed to get Bin Laden, Zawahiri, Omar…the light footprint strategy will probably go down as the prime reason we are still fighting in the endless war. Risk aversion lead to this decision. (It hurts me to have to agree to this.)
  • Hardest part of their job is to watch and see failure…Cassandra…they predicted some of these failures.
  • They continue beating the drum of what does the Taliban want and talk about how the U.S. removed ISIS from Syria with a small footprint…Trump policy is scrambled eggs…(something, something doth protest too much)…
  • Don’t want to watch American service members sacrifice themselves over the politics and not looking to win these wars.
  • Third segment – 9-11 wars in the era of the Great Power confrontation – claim the pivot away from terror has already happened. Only 20,000 currently deployed in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan?
  • The Indo-pacific command already has 4times the personnel as CENTCOM?
  • Claim that this is an argument in the defense world is simply they don’t want to fight anymore.
  • One thing that bothers them is that we need to show strength against China/Russia…they claim that this is not valid because we cannot win in Afghanistan. Not projecting strength, this is a blueprint on how to neat the U.S. (this sound like our book discussion on Kilcullen)
  • Really, Really, Really criticize the erratic politics that have driven the war and the Senior Military Leadership. Say that we lack the vision / institutional memory to fight a long war.
  • COIN doctrine in Asia is horrific. Who wants to wage a counterinsurgency there!?
  • Their parting shots are don’t be surprised if we quit the fight there that we will get hit back here. There will be security ramifications here.

Essentially, I agree with them that the politics of this war have been inconsistent and that there has been a systemic failure of leadership (Afghanistan Papers). I think they are on point in regards to the jihadis continuing to fight and the real motivations for them. So where do I disagree? Their argument boils down to we have to fight them there so we don’t fight them here. Honestly, I agree with that to an extent but their needs to be more of an argument on when how and what is to be done. Again, in my opinion they spent too much time defending themselves without really making a case for defending themselves. Calling folks that want to withdrawal from Afghanistan a nexus of isolationists and peaceniks will not win an argument. Maybe I need to relisten. I am disappointed how this episode ended.